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ABSTRACT

The Superfund Task Force recently released its
final report on the implementation of its
recommendations for improving the Superfund
program. The Task Force was given five goals for
improving the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA’s”), implementation. These goals are to
expedite cleanup and remediation, re-invigorate
responsible party cleanup and reuse, encourage
foreign investment, promote redevelopment and
community revitalization, and engage with partners
and stakeholders. While the Task Force’s
recommendations
have
improved
CERCLA’s
implementation, many of CERCLA’s structural flaws
remain intact. Specifically, CERCLA still has a severe
shortage of funding, an unfair liability scheme,
perverse incentives, due process concerns, excessive
litigation costs for PRPs, and social justice concerns.
To resolve these flaws, this Note proposes that the
legislature take legislative and administrative action to
remove the petroleum exclusion; reimpose and expand
the superfund taxes; remove CERCLA’s retroactive,
joint, and several liability scheme; create an
independent board to evaluate CERCLA liability using
the gore factors; create an objective and racially just
NPL-placement policy and fines imposition policy, and
engage with nonprofit organizations.
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INTRODUCTION

On September 9, 2019, the Superfund Task Force released its
final report on its recommendations for improving CERCLA’s
implementation.1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), commonly
known as Superfund, was enacted to deter parties from releasing
hazardous substances at sites and to establish a means for the EPA to
clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites.2 To accomplish these
goals, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and several liability
on all potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).3 Such PRPs include (1)
current owners or operators of a facility, (2) past owners or operators
of a facility at the time the hazardous substances were released, (3)
arrangers who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous
substances, and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances.4
CERCLA also grants the EPA the authority to pursue cleanup
and enforcement actions in response to the release or threatened

* Manny Marcos, J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of
Law. Thank you to Professor Nicholas Johnson for his invaluable guidance and
advice, to the editors and staff of the Fordham Environmental Law Review for their
helpful assistance, and to my family for their loving encouragement and support.
1
See Superfund Task Force Final Report, EPA.GOV (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-09/documents/sftfreport_v17-95_for508s.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
2
See Roger Armstrong, CERCLA’s Petroleum Exclusion: Bad Policy in a
Problematic Statute, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (1994).
3
See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c) (2012).
4
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2012).

2021]

SQUARING THE CERCLA

509

release of hazardous substances.5 To ensure a site’s cleanup, the EPA
may pursue either an enforcement action to compel the PRPs to clean
up the polluted site or a cleanup action to clean up the polluted site
itself.6 In cleaning up a site, the EPA may use the money collected
from either the PRPs7 or the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust
Fund (“Superfund”).8
On May 22, 2017, former EPA administrator E. Scott Pruitt
formed a Superfund Task Force and gave it thirty days to provide
recommendations and strategies for improving CERCLA’s
implementation.9 Specifically, the Task Force was given five goals for
improving CERCLA’s implementation.10 These five goals are (1) to
expedite cleanup and remediation, (2) to re-invigorate responsible
party cleanup and reuse, (3) to encourage foreign investment, (4) to
promote redevelopment and community revitalization, and (5) to
engage with partners and stakeholders.11 One month later, the Task
Force outlined forty-two recommendations for the EPA to pursue to
achieve these five goals.12 On September 9, 2019, the Task Force
submitted its final report on the successful implementation of these
recommendations.13
While these recommendations have improved CERCLA’s
implementation as evidenced by the Task Force’s final report, many
of CERCLA’s structural flaws remain intact and will require
legislative changes to resolve. Specifically, CERCLA still has (a) a
severe shortage of funding, (b) an unfair liability scheme, (c) perverse
incentives, (d) due process concerns, (e) excessive litigation costs for
PRPs, and (f) social justice concerns.

5

42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1)(2012).
See id.
7
42 U.S.C. §9607(a).
8
42 U.S.C. §96011(a)(2012).
9
Superfund Task Force Recommendations, EPA.GOV. i, iii (July 25,
2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201707/documents/superfund_task_force_report.pdf [hereinafter Task Force
Recommendations].
10
Id. at iv.
11
Id.
12
Id. at iv.
13
See Final Report, supra note 1.
6
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This Note will explore how the Task Force resolved or failed
to resolve CERCLA’s many flaws. This Note will also provide its own
solutions for correcting flaws that the Task Force failed to resolve.
Unlike the Task Force’s recommendations, many of these solutions
will require structural changes to CERCLA’s legislative framework.
Part I of this Note provides an in-depth overview of CERCLA’s
doctrinal structure and enforcement mechanisms. Part II of this Note
describes the myriad of flaws inherent in CERCLA’s structure and
enforcement mechanisms. Part III of this Note explores how the Task
Force’s recommendations solve or fail to solve many of CERCLA’s
flaws. Part III also proposes legislative and administrative changes to
address these structural and surface flaws that the Task Force failed to
resolve. This Note maintains that these legislative and administrative
changes to CERCLA are necessary for a more effective, efficient, and
equitable CERCLA.
I.

OVERVIEW OF CERCLA

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), commonly known as
Superfund, is a hastily drafted statute that is notorious for its vague
terminology and its confusing legislative history.14 The legislature
enacted CERCLA to correct the remedial gaps in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act’s (“RCRA’s”) cradle-to-grave
program and to establish a means for cleaning up abandoned
hazardous waste sites.15 To accomplish these two goals, CERCLA
grants the EPA the authority to pursue cleanup and enforcement
actions in response to the release or threatened release of a variety of
hazardous substances.16 Such substances, however, do not include
petroleum or gas usable for fuel.17
To finance cleanup and enforcement actions and to deter
prospective polluters, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and
several liability on all potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).18 Such
14

Jeffrey M. Moss, Impact of CERCLA On Real Estate Transactions:
What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, . . . Should Know, 6 BYU J. PUB.
HEALTH 365, 367 (1992).
15
Armstrong, supra note 2.
16
See 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1)(2012).
17
42 U.S.C. §9601(14)(2012).
18
See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c)(2012).
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liability is retroactive because parties may be held liable for acts that
occurred before CERCLA was enacted, strict because the EPA need
not prove causation or intent, and joint and several because PRPs may
be held liable for the entire cost related to a site when the harm cannot
be apportioned or there are no other solvent PRPs.19
To ensure a site’s cleanup, the EPA may either (1) pursue an
enforcement action to compel the PRPs to clean up the polluted site or
(2) pursue a cleanup action to clean up the site itself.20 In cleaning up
a polluted site, the EPA may use the money collected from either the
PRPs21 or the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund
(“Superfund”).22 The Superfund was initially funded by revenues
derived from special taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries
and large firms,23 but is now financed almost entirely by the general
tax revenue, resulting in a precipitous decline in Superfund funding24
and a slowing down of site completion.25
When cleaning up a site itself, the EPA can pursue two types
of cleanup actions: removal operations and remedial operations.26
Removal operations are short-term actions taken by the EPA in
response to the imminent release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.27 By contrast, remedial operations are long-term actions
taken by the EPA to permanently reduce the risk of the release of
hazardous substances.28 Remedial operations, however, can only be
taken at places listed on the National Priority List (“NPL”).29 To be
listed on the NPL, a proposed site is first subject to a Preliminary

19

See id.
42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1).
21
42 U.S.C. §9607(a).
22
42 U.S.C. §96011(a)(2012).
23
The Return of the Superfund Tax, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (June 22,
2010), https://www.enn.com/articles/41458-the-return-of-the-superfund-tax.
24
Jessica Morrison, Polluted Sites Linger Under U.S. Cleanup Program,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://cen.acs.org/articles/95/i14/Polluted-sites-linger-under-US-clean-upprogram.html.
25
Id.
26
42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1).
27
42 U.S.C. §9601(23)(2012).
28
42 U.S.C. §9601(24)(2012).
29
42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1).
20
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Assessment / Site Inspection (“PA / SI”).30 If the proposed site is found
to have significant environmental issues, it is then subject to a
Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study (“RI / FS”).31 Once the RI
/ FS is complete, the EPA conducts a hearing that produces a Record
of Decision (“ROD”), which sets forth the cleanup plan based on an
analysis of the RI / FS’s data.32 These cleanup procedures and
processes are often slow,33 inefficient,34 arbitrary,35 overly
ambitious,36 expensive,37 and unevenly38 – possibly even inequitably39
– applied.
CERCLA also grants the EPA the authority to order private
parties through unilateral administrative orders (“UAOs”) to take
short-term or long-term cleanup action if there is an imminent,
substantially dangerous release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.40 Such UAO’s, however, are not subject to preenforcement review, and parties who refused to comply with these
UAO’s may incur treble damages for the costs incurred by the
Superfund due to their noncompliance.41
After PRPs conduct a mandatory cleanup of a site, the PRPs
can require the EPA to apportion liability to other PRPs through a
30

42 U.S.C. §9605(4)(d)(2012).
42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1).
32
Id.
33
Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of
Failure, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 168 (1993).
34
See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly Is "Clean"? An
Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT., 2, 22 (1999).
35
See Superfund: The Good, the Bad, and the Broken, FREEDOM WORKS
(Feb. 27, 1998), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/issue-analysis-70superfund-good-bad-and-broken.
36
See Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut That Failed, PERC
POL’Y SERIES 1, 7 (May 1996), https://www.perc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/ps5.pdf.
37
Mcgee, supra note 33, at 170-71.
38
Richard L. Stroup & Bradley Townsend, EPA’s New Superfund Rule:
Making the Problem Worse, 3 CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T 72, 73 (1993).
39
See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The
Racial Divide In Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, 15.3 NAT’L L.J, 1, 2
(Sept. 21, 1992), https://www.ejnet.org/ej/nlj.pdf.
40
42 U.S.C. §9606(a)(2012).
41
42 U.S.C. §9607(c)(3)(2012).
31
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contribution suit.42 PRPs, however, are not subject to contribution
suits for matters addressed in an EPA settlement.43 Courts hearing
contribution suits apply the rules of equity to determine whether to
apportion the harm caused by the pollutants and by what degree to
apportion it.44 Courts often determine equitability using the Gore
factors, which take into account (a) the ability of the parties to
demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal
of the hazardous substances can be distinguished, (b) the quantity of
hazardous substances involved, (c) how toxic the hazardous
substances are, (d) how involved the parties were in the release of the
hazardous substances, (e) how careful the parties were with the
hazardous substances in proportion to their toxicity, and (f) how
cooperative the parties were with the federal, state, or local officials.45
Courts hearing contribution suits have the discretion to look at a
variety of other equitable factors besides the Gore factors.46
Consequently, private parties who wish to pursue contribution suits
have difficulty establishing the “correct” apportionment methodology,
and as such, the results of such contribution suits are unpredictable.47
PRPs may also conduct a voluntary site cleanup and sue other
PRPs for costs if they conducted the cleanup in accordance with the
national contingency plan.48 In these cost recovery suits, PRPs can sue
other PRPs jointly and severally unless a reasonable basis for
apportioning liability can be established.49 Moreover, PRPs are subject
to cost recovery for matters already addressed in an EPA settlement.50
42

42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1)(2012).
42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(2)(2012).
44
42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1).
45
Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action under CERCLA:
Navigating the Intersection of Sections 107(a) and 113(f), 5 MICH. J. EVNTL. &
ADMIN. L. 117, 128 n.50 (2015) (citing United States v. Township of Brighton, 153
F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 466
(W.D. Okla. 1987); Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of
Superfund: A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. EVNTL.
L.J. 36, 60 (1994)).
46
Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund Hazardous Substance
Liability and Supreme Court Reversal of All Federal Circuits, 33 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 641 (2009).
47
See id.
48
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(|b)(2012).
49
Ferrey, supra note 46, at 640-41.
50
Id.
43
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In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).51 SARA, among other things,
requires that the EPA follow all applicable, relevant, and appropriate
requirements (“ARARs”) when pursuing a cleanup or enforcement
action.52 Specifically, SARA requires the EPA to take remedial action
that protects human health and the environment, is cost-effective, and
meets both federal and local environmental standards.53 SARA also
requires the EPA to disfavor remedies that entail the offsite transport
and disposal of hazardous substances.54 Sixteen years after Congress
enacted SARA, it enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act (“SBLRBRA”), which, among other
things, establishes a federal grants program for the development of
contaminated or potentially contaminated property.55 The SBLRBRA
also provides incentives for local governments and private parties –
who can clean up sites more quickly and efficiently than the EPA56 –
to revitalize such property.57
CERCLA also imposes retroactive, strict, joint, and several
liability on a broad range of PRPs.58 Such PRPs include (1) current
owners or operators of a facility, (2) past owners or operators of a
facility at the time the hazardous substances were released, (3)
arrangers who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous
substances, and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances. 59 In
practical terms, these PRPs can include buyers, sellers, lenders,
corporate officers, employees, majority shareholders, lessors, lessees,

51

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2006)).
52
42 U.S.C. §9621(b)(1)(2012).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
42 U.S.C. §9628(a)(2012).
56
See John Shanahan, How To Rescue Superfund: Bringing Common
Sense to the Process, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 6, 9 (July 31, 1995),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1995/pdf/bg1047.pdf; Stroup, supra note 36,
at 21.
57
42 U.S.C. §9628(a).
58
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2012).
59
Id.
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successor corporations, parent corporations, trustees, executors, and
remediation firms.60
A. Owners
Under CERCLA, current and past owners of a site can be held
liable for the release of hazardous substances.61 Such parties can
include buyers, sellers, lessors, successor corporations, trustees,
executors, corporate officers, and majority shareholders.62 When the
legislature originally enacted CERCLA, purchasers of polluted
properties could be held liable for any hazardous substances released
by prior owners.63 Furthermore, purchasers could still be held liable
even after they conducted their due diligence and were unaware of any
released hazardous substances.64 In fact, the only recognizable defense
parties could claim was for force majeure acts, such as an act of God,
war, or acts or omissions by third parties who did not have a
contractual relationship with the defendant.65
In response to the lack of an innocent purchaser defense,
Congress enacted SARA.66 SARA, among other things, creates a
defense for land purchasers who comply with a number of challenging
past and continuing obligations.67 Specifically, SARA creates a
defense for land purchasers who:
(1) Had no constructive knowledge of any hazardous
substances on the site at the time of purchase;
(2) Conducted an “all appropriate inquiry” (“AAI”) by,
among other things, hiring a qualified environmental
professional;

60

Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96.
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1-2).
62
Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96.
63
See Paul C. Quinn The EPA Guidance on Landowner Liability and the
Innocent Landowner Defense: The All Appropriate Inquiry Standard: Fact or
Fiction, 2 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 149 (1991).
64
See 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(2012).
65
Id.
66
See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–
9675 (2006)).
67
42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(2012).
61
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(3) Exercised appropriate due care with respect to the
hazardous substances;
(4) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions
of third parties and their foreseeable consequences;
(5) Fully cooperate with all parties authorize to conduct
response actions related to the property;
(6) Complies with any land-use restrictions established or
relied on in connection with the response action;
(7) Do not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any
institutional control employed at the property in
connection with the response action; and;
(8) Take reasonable steps to stop or prevent any current or
future releases and prevent or limit the exposure of any
human, environmental, or natural resource to any
released hazardous substance.68
SARA also creates defenses for certain government entities and
parties who acquired polluted properties by inheritance or bequest.69
Sixteen years after Congress enacted SARA, it enacted the
SBLRBRA, which, among other things, provides a defense for bona
fide purchasers who knew about the hazardous substances but acted in
good faith and fully cooperated with the EPA.70 Specifically, the
SBLRBRA creates a defense for bona fide land purchasers who:
(1) Purchased the facility after January 11, 2002;
(2) Established that all disposal of hazardous substances
took place before the purchaser acquired the facility;
(3) Conducted an AAI into the prior ownership and uses of
the facility;
(4) Provide/ed all legal required notices as to the release of
any hazardous substances at the facility;
(5) Were not/is not potentially liable or affiliated with any
prior owner or operator who is potentially liable for
response costs at the facility;
(6) Took/take reasonable steps to stop or prevent any
current or future releases;

68

Id.
42 U.S.C. §9601(35)(A)(ii-iii).
70
42 U.S.C. §9601(40).
69
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(7) Prevent/ed or limit/ed the exposure of any human,
environmental, or natural resource to any released
hazardous substance;
(1) Fully cooperate/ed with and assist/ed all parties
authorized to conduct response actions or natural
resource restoration at the facility;
(2) Comply with any land use restrictions established or
relied upon in connection with the response action;
(3) Did/do not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any
institutional control employed at the property in
connection with the response action, and;
(4) Comply/ed with all government subpoenas.71
The SBLRBRA also provides a defense for landowners who own
properties at risk of becoming contaminated by a nearby polluted
site.72 To qualify for the contiguous landowner defense, a party must
have conducted an AAI into the prior ownership and uses of the
facility, had no constructive knowledge of the nearby contaminated
site, did not contribute or consent to the release or threatened release
of the hazardous substances, and complied with a number of
challenging past and continuing obligations that substantially parallel
those for the bona fide purchaser defense.73 The SBLRBRA also
provides a de micromis exemption for transporters and arrangers that
contributed less than a specified amount of hazardous substances at a
site.74
If a PRP qualifies for these or other defenses or exemptions
under CERCLA, the EPA may issue that PRP a comfort/status letter
stating that it meets the appropriate requirements.75 Such
comfort/status letters, however, are often non-binding; as such, they
often do not always provide reasonable assurances to PRPs.76 The
EPA may also issue comfort/status letters to inform interested parties
of site-specific legal and environmental information concerning the
71

Id.
42 U.S.C. §9607(q)(1)(A)(2012).
73
Id.
74
42 U.S.C. 9607(o)(2012).
75
Frona M. Powel, Amending CERCLA to Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 53
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 113, 126-27 (1998).
76
Id.
72
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reuse of impacted properties.77 Such legal and environmental
information can include past and present contamination, cleanup
status, current or potential EPA involvement at the site, and any
statutory protections or agency policies that may pertain to the
interested party’s situation.78 The EPA may also administer
comfort/status letters to suggest reasonable steps that the EPA believes
a party should take at the property to protect human health and the
environment.79
B. Operators, Transporters, and Arrangers
Operators are also liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous
waste under CERCLA.80 An operator is defined in the statute as a party
that operates – but need not own – a polluting facility.81 Such parties
can include lenders, corporate officers, employees, majority
shareholders, lessees, parent corporations, trustees, executors, and
remediation firms.82 As the legislature failed to define the term
“operates,” the Supreme Court defined it as managing, directing, or
conducting operations related to the leakage or disposal of hazardous
substances or making decisions about compliance with environmental
regulations.83
By contrast, Congress clarified the participation standard as it
relates to secured lenders.84 Under CERCLA, secured lenders are
exempt from liability for polluted sites if they have an ownership
interest in a site primarily to protect a security interest and do not
participate in the management of the site.85 To further clarify when a
secured lender is exempt from liability, Congress enacted the Asset
77

Id.
See Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Protection Agency [EPA] 20
(July 29, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201908/documents/common-elements-guide-mem-2019.pdf.
79
Id.
80
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1).
81
42 U.S.C. §9601(20).
82
Moss, supra note 14, at 375-96.
83
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1998) (remanding
the case for determination as to whether Bestfoods, the parent corporation, might
be deemed an operator).
84
See 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(g).
85
42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(f-g).
78
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Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
of 1996 (“ACLLDIPA”).86 Under the ACLLDIPA, a secured lender is
only held liable for polluted sites if it actually participates in its
management or operational affairs, as defined extensively in the
ACLLDIPA.87 As a result of CERCLA’s liability scheme, parties such
as lenders and parent corporations are perversely incentivized not to
oversee or involve themselves in the cleanup of sites so as not to be
held strictly, jointly, and severally liable as an operator. CERCLA also
imposes liability on (a) transporters who delivered hazardous
substances to disposal or treatment facilities if they participated in the
selection of the facility88 and (b) arrangers who arranged for the
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances if that was the intent of
their actions.89
II.

THE FLAWS OF CERCLA

CERCLA has many flaws. First, the petroleum exclusion is
inequitable, as CERCLA’s overlap with Section 311 of the Clean
Water Act and RCRA is imperfect and does not justify the petroleum
exclusion.90 Indeed, Section 311 of the Clean Water Act only covers
hazardous spills on navigable waters, and RCRA contains several
remedial gaps that require CERCLA for correction.91 For example,
RCRA does not cover past spills that do not present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to humans or the environment.92
Additionally, the petroleum exclusion decreases funds available for
site cleanup and further complicates the statute, resulting in money
being wasted on litigation costs.93
Second, the Superfund is severely underfunded, with funding
declining by nearly half from 1999 to 2013 due to the expiration of the

86

Id.
Id.
88
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4).
89
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (finding that Shell did not intend for spills of
hazardous waste to occur and therefore was not an arranger as defined by Section
§9607(a)(3)).
90
Armstrong, supra note 2, at 1190-91.
91
Id.
92
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
93
Id. at 1186-87.
87
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special taxes.94 As a result, the rate of site completion has slowed
precipitously, with twenty-five sites completed in 1995, but only one
site completed in 2016.95 Third, CERCLA’s retroactive, strict, joint,
and several liability scheme encourages excessive litigation costs, as
individual PRPs can be held liable for the entire cost related to a site
and are thus incentivized to fight the EPA in court and sue all PRPs
for contribution.96 Although these contribution suits allow the EPA to
shift the burden of suing PRPs onto other PRPs, the excessive
litigation costs incurred by PRPs due to CERCLA amount to billions
of dollars in costs.97 Moreover, because CERCLA liability is
potentially unlimited, insurance companies are reluctant to insure
PRPs against CERCLA liability, and PRPs, in turn, are reluctant to
involve themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties.98
Fourth, CERCLA’s retroactive, strict, joint, and several
liability scheme results in an unfair allocation of financial
responsibility, as parties who contributed a small amount of waste can
be held liable for the entire cost related to a site.99 Furthermore, these
parties can be held entirely liable even if they unknowingly released
waste at the site prior to CERCLA’s enactment and did not
independently cause any damage to humans or the environment.100
Accordingly, PRPs who would have otherwise cleaned up polluted
sites are hesitant to do so because they can be held liable for the entire
cost related to a site through the slightest of mistakes.101
Moreover, as Professor Epstein argues, CERCLA’s joint and
several liability scheme creates collective action problems that
perversely incentivize PRPs not to voluntarily clean up or reduce their
waste.102 Indeed, because a PRP can be held entirely liable for
voluntary cleanup costs and must recapture its expenses through cost
recovery suits at the end of the site cleanup, it alone bears the initial
94

Morrison, supra note 24.
Id.
96
See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c).
97
See Mcgee, supra note 33, at 178.
98
See id. at 174-75.
99
See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a-c).
100
See id.
101
See McGee, supra note 33, at 175.
102
See Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73
GEO. L.J. 1377, 1385-86 (1985).
95
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costs of the site cleanup, while the initial savings are spread out thinly
to all PRPs.103 Additionally, because it may take decades to complete
site cleanup and resolve cost recovery suits, it may take that long for
PRPs to recapture their cleanup costs – some of which will inevitably
be lost in litigation expenses.104 Moreover, because many PRPs cannot
reduce their waste to a legally permissible level, any reduction of
waste by such PRPs is effectively rendered worthless due to
CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme.105 Instead, the optimal
strategy for such PRPs is to reduce their precaution costs and save
money, as the initial savings that a PRP may earn can be substantial
while the initial losses that it creates will be borne by other PRPs.106
Thus, CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme incentivizes PRPs
to further pollute sites.107
Fifth, parties such as lenders108 and parent corporations109 are
perversely incentivized not to oversee or involve themselves in the
cleanup of polluted sites so as not to be held strictly, jointly, and
severally liable as an operator.110 As a result, sites are inadequately
cleaned up, often resulting in the leakage of even more hazardous
waste.111 Sixth, CERCLA’s innocent purchaser defense, bona fide
purchaser defense, and contiguous landowner defense are inadequate,
103
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as they are merely defenses that must be raised at trial and not
exemptions; as such, they do not protect the economic and reputational
interests of PRPs who must still pay legal fees and bear the brunt of
negative publicity related to the case.112 Moreover, PRPs must meet a
number of challenging requirements to qualify for and keep these
defenses and can lose them through the slightest of mistakes.113 As a
result, parties are hesitant to involve themselves in the revitalization
of polluted properties.114
Seventh, PRPs are denied due process under CERCLA, as they
cannot obtain pre-enforcement review for UAOs, which require them
to take short term or long term cleanup action in response to an
imminent, substantially dangerous release or threatened release of
hazardous substances.115 Furthermore, PRPs who refused to comply
with such orders to remove or remediate hazardous substances may
incur treble damages for the costs incurred by the Superfund due to
their noncompliance.116 Moreover, although the PRPs can later sue the
EPA or other PRPs for cleanup costs, by then the former PRPs are
already in massive financial distress – sometimes even facing
bankruptcy – due to high cleanup costs and excessive litigation
expenses.117 As a result, parties are hesitant to involve themselves in
the revitalization of polluted sites.118
Eighth, the EPA’s investigation, cleanup, and reuse process is
slow and inefficient.119 Furthermore, too much time and money are
wasted on administrative and litigation expenses rather than on actual
site cleanup.120 Additionally, the EPA is highly conservative in its
assessment of potential risks and overly ambitious and inflexible in its
cleanup goals.121 For example, in a sample of 150 NPL sites,
researchers found the median number of expected cancer cases at the
112
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sites for a thirty-year period was less than 0.1%, and the cost per
cancer case averted in most sites was over $100 million.122 Likewise,
the EPA often requires overly stringent groundwater standards at
cleanup sites where water is not expected to be drunk.123
Additionally, the EPA does not clean up the most hazardous
sites first; instead, it gives preference to sites not on the NPL to avoid
the bureaucracy involved in cleaning up NPL sites.124 Furthermore,
NPL status does not necessarily correlate with health risk, as the
ranking system to qualify a site for a place on the NPL is arbitrary;
some sites on the list may pose little risk to humans and the
environment, while others not listed may pose more significant
risks.125 Moreover, the EPA often hires ineffectual contractors to clean
up sites for inordinate amounts of money, sometimes even paying such
contractors bonuses.126
Tenth, the EPA’s remedies are uneven from site to site, often
driven by community lobbying.127 Such lobbying creates perverse
incentives for the EPA to impose overly stringent cleanup standards
on sites to satisfy lobbying parties.128 Conversely, some critics allege
that unevenness of the EPA’s remedies results in environmental
injustice towards minority communities because such communities
have less political clout and are less represented in the government and
on the boards of polluting companies.129 As a result, these critics allege
that it takes the EPA longer to place sites on the NPL and clean them
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up in minority communities than in non-minority communities.130
Moreover, these critics further allege that the EPA imposes lesser fines
and chooses less permanent treatment solutions in minoritycommunities than in non-minority communities.131 Also subject to lax
enforcement are nonprofit organizations, municipalities, and
government agencies.132 In fact, the Department of Defense generates
the most hazardous waste in the country yet is often not asked to pay
for the costs related to such waste.133
Eleventh, notwithstanding the EPA’s Brownfields Program,
the EPA needs to do more to involve local governments134 and private
actors135 in the cleanup process, as these parties are more accountable
for the costs, speed, and effectiveness of the site’s cleanup and can
clean up sites quicker and more efficiently than the EPA. Finally, as
comfort/status letters are often non-binding, they do not generally
provide reasonable assurances to PRPs.136 Consequently, involved
parties are hesitant to rely on such comfort/status letters to purchase,
sell, lend, or clean up polluted sites, resulting in further economic
inefficiencies and environmental damage.137
In response to CERCLA’s many flaws, The Superfund Task
Force was commissioned to provide recommendations on how the
EPA can improve its implementation of CERCLA.138 Specifically, the
Task Force was given five goals for improving CERCLA’s
implementation. These five goals are (1) to expedite cleanup and
remediation, (2) to re-invigorate responsible party cleanup and reuse,
(3) to encourage foreign investment, (4) to promote redevelopment
and community revitalization, and (5) to engage with partners and
stakeholders.139 To effectuate these five goals, the Task Force outlined
forty-two recommendations for the EPA to incorporate into its
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implementation of CERCLA140 These recommendations have already
begun to be implemented by the EPA, and the Task Force has
submitted its final report on the successful implementation of these
recommendations in 2019.141
With the advent of these recommendations, several surface
problems of CERCLA have been resolved. Nevertheless, the Task
Force only provided recommendations for improving CERCLA’s
implementation – not its statutory scheme; as such, many of
CERCLA’s structural flaws remain intact and will require legislative
changes to sufficiently resolve. Part III of this Note will analyze how
the Task Force’s recommendations solve many of CERCLA’s
problems. Where the Task Force’s recommendations fail to
sufficiently address such problems, Part III of this Note will provide
its own solutions for improving CERCLA’s structure and enforcement
mechanisms. In contrast to the Task Force’s recommendations, the
solutions set forth in Part III of this Note will often require legislative
changes to CERCLA’s statutory scheme.
HOW THE TASK FORCE ADDRESSED MANY – BUT NOT ALL
– OF CERCLA’S FLAWS

III.

The Task Force’s recommendations addressed many, but not
all, of CERCLA’s flaws. First, the Task Force did not address the
petroleum exclusion, which inequitably exempts one industry from
CERCLA liability.142 As a result of the petroleum exclusion, less
funding is available for site cleanup.143 Moreover, the petroleum
exclusion further complicates the statute, resulting in money being
wasted on litigation costs.144 To create a more efficient, effective, and
equitable CERCLA, the legislature must remove the petroleum
exclusion from CERCLA’s statutory scheme.
Second, the Task Force addressed CERCLA’s lack of
funding145 by introducing ways for the EPA to spend money more
efficiently. Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among other
140
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things, that the EPA (a) create an administrative review process for
remedy decisions with an estimated cost of $50 million;146 (b) review
third-party contracting procedures for large EPA-approved contractors
and third-party contracts to ensure that contractors operate efficiently
and are not overpaid;147 (c) use third parties to evaluate optimal
remediations for polluted sites, with a focus on optimizing remediation
for complex sites or sites of significant public interest;148 (d) and speed
up the cleanup process.149 While these recommendations seek to
remedy CERCLA’s lack of funding, they merely put a bandage on a
fiscal wound. Indeed, CERCLA’s lack of funding is largely due to
competition for general tax revenue funds.150 What is needed is not
merely smarter spending by the EPA, but increased funding for the
Superfund.
To obtain such increased funding, the legislature must
reimpose the Superfund taxes on the chemical and petroleum
industries and large firms. Moreover, the legislature should expand
these special taxes to include consumer and commercial goods that are
harmful to the environment when discharged, such as artificial
detergents and gasoline. The benefits of expanding these special taxes
are threefold: First, by imposing special taxes on various parties, the
costs will be spread out thinly and no one party will be forced to bear
them alone; second, such cost spreading is fair because all parties that
directly or indirectly benefit from the pollution will be forced to pay
for its remediation and prevention; and third, imposing these special
taxes will result in higher prices for environmentally hazardous
consumer and commercial goods, which will desensitize people from
buying products and engaging in activities that are harmful to the
environment.
Third, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s slow, inefficient,
and inflexible investigation, cleanup, and reuse process151 by
recommending several changes to the EPA’s standards and
methodologies. Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among
other things, that the EPA:
146
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(a) Focus resources on deleting or partially
deleting NPL sites, especially those that require
immediate and intense attention;152
(b) Use systematic planning, best management
practices, remedy optimization,153 and state-ofthe-art technologies to expedite cleanup;154
(c) Use adaptive management at large or complex
sites to make cleanup more efficient;155
(d) Designate one agency to be in charge of site
cleanup to reduce overlap and duplication;156
(e) Include time limits, financial limits, and best
practices for completing RI/FS,157 and;
(f) Make the groundwater policy less stringent for
aquifers unlikely to be used for drinking
water.158
These recommendations will make the EPA’s investigation,
cleanup, and reuse process quicker, more efficient, and flexible.
Absent from these recommendations, however, is any suggestion that
the EPA improve its NPL-placement policy to better correlate with
actual risks to humans or the environment. Accordingly, the EPA
152

Task Force Recommendations, supra note 9, at 1-2.
Id. at 5-6 (Remedy optimization is the effort to identify and implement
specific actions that could improve the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of any
phase of the removal and remedial process. To identify such opportunities, regions
may (a) use a systematic site review by a team of independent technical experts,
(b) apply techniques or principles of Green Remediation or Triad (systematic
project planning, dynamic work strategies, and use of real-time measurement
technologies), or (c) apply other approaches to identify opportunities for greater
efficiency and effectiveness.); Id. at n.1.
154
Id. at 5-7.
155
Id. at 2-3 (Adaptive Management is an approach that focuses
resources on the development of a site strategy with measurable decision points
and an understanding of site conditions and uncertainties. Based on these
uncertainties, decisions are then made that allow the EPA to adapt accordingly if
these uncertainties result in fundamental changes to site conditions. Under an
Adaptive Management strategy, Regions are encouraged to consider greater use of
early and interim actions to address immediate risks, prevent source migration, and
return portions of sites to use pending more detailed evaluations on other parts of
sites.); Id.
156
Id. at 12.
157
Id. at 4.
158
Id.
153

528 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
should appoint an independent board of scientists to create a more
objective NPL-placement policy that better correlates with actual risks
to humans and the environment. By reforming the NPL-placement
policy, the EPA will be able to focus its attention on cleaning up and
remediating its most hazardous sites.
Nevertheless, site cleanup would probably be quicker and
more efficient if CERCLA was defederalized, as states are more
accountable than the EPA and are likely to work on local polluted sites
more efficiently.159 In a defederalized CERCLA, the federal
government would provide states with the necessary funding; the
states would have the authority to clean up NPL and non-NPL sites;
and the EPA would retain emergency cleanup capacity.160
Realistically, however, the defederalization of CERCLA will probably
never happen, as the federal government – like any other entity – does
not cede power easily. As such, the Task Force’s recommendations for
making site cleanup quicker and more efficient are the best practical
way to achieve these goals.
Fourth, the Task Force addressed the excessive litigation costs
incurred by the EPA and PRPs under CERCLA161 by recommending,
among other things, that the EPA encourage PRPs to reach early
settlements with the EPA.162 To that end, the Task Force
recommended that the EPA provide incentives in the form of reduced
oversight to PRPs who perform timely, quality work under an
agreement with the EPA.163 Likewise, the Task Force recommended
that the EPA use enforcement mechanisms such as UAOs as deterrents
against recalcitrant parties to discourage protracted negotiations.164
Even with these recommendations, CERCLA’s retroactive,
strict, joint, and several liability scheme ensures that litigation costs
for PRPs remain extremely high.165 Indeed, as a result of CERCLA’s
liability scheme, PRPs can be held unfairly liable for all costs related
to a site even if they unknowingly released hazardous waste at the site
159
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prior to CERCLA’s enactment and did not independently cause any
damage to humans or the environment.166 Thus, PRPs are incentivized
to fight the EPA in court and sue all parties involved in the pollution
– however tangentially – for contribution.167 As a result, litigation
costs incurred by PRPs amount to billions of dollars in costs.168
Furthermore, because CERCLA liability is potentially
unlimited, insurance companies are reluctant to insure PRPs against
CERCLA liability, and PRPs, in turn, are reluctant to involve
themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties.169 Additionally,
PRPs who would have otherwise cleaned up polluted sites are hesitant
to do so because they can be held liable for the entire cost related to a
site through the slightest of mistakes.170 Furthermore, PRPs are
perversely incentivized not to clean up or reduce their waste because
they alone bear the initial costs of such efforts, while the initial savings
earned are spread out thinly to all PRPs.171 Moreover, because many
PRPs cannot reduce their waste to a legally permissible level, the
optimal strategy for such PRPs is to reduce precaution costs and save
money, as the initial savings that a PRP may earn can be substantial
while the initial losses that it creates will be borne by other PRPs.172
Therefore, to lower litigation costs for PRPs and make
CERCLA more equitable, efficient, and effective, the legislature
needs to fundamentally change CERCLA’s liability scheme.
Specifically, the legislature must do away with CERCLA’s
retroactive, joint, and several liability for PRPs. Thus, PRPs will only
be held liable for their portion of the pollution at the time when such
pollution was illegal. Nonetheless, CERCLA liability should remain
strict (and several), as it would be very difficult for the EPA to prove
causation and intent and discharging parties are the least-cost avoiders.
Moreover, to determine a PRP’s proportionate liability under
CERCLA, the legislature should amend CERCLA to create an
independent board that would determine a PRP’s proportionate
166
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liability by applying the Gore factors. Such determinations should be
made within a short timeframe and only be reviewable after the
cleanup is complete to prevent any delays and ensure that the EPA has
the requisite funds needed for site cleanup. Additionally, PRPs should
still be liable for treble damages due to non-compliance. Nonetheless,
PRPs will have fewer due process concerns because CERCLA liability
will be limited rather than potentially unlimited, and an independent
board – not the EPA – will determine CERCLA liability. Accordingly,
PRPs will be less hesitant to involve themselves in the revitalization
of polluted properties.
Furthermore, contribution suits – though not cost recovery
suits – will be rendered irrelevant, as PRPs will only be required to
pay their fair share of the costs related to a site. As such, litigation
costs for PRPs will be substantially lowered. Moreover, parties such
as lenders and parent companies will be less hesitant to oversee or
involve themselves in the cleanup of polluted sites, as they will only
be held liable for their share of the pollution. Thus, site cleanup will
be more effective and efficient.
Additionally, insurance companies will be less hesitant to
insure private parties against CERCLA liability, who, in turn, will be
less hesitant to involve themselves with polluted properties.
Furthermore, PRPs will be less incentivized to fight the EPA in court
because they will no longer be potentially liable for the entire cost
related to a site. As a result, litigation costs for PRPs will be lowered.
Additionally, PRPs will be incentivized to reduce their pollution and
thereby reduce their proportional liability under CERCLA. Moreover,
PRPs will no longer be incentivized to reduce their precaution costs
and not conduct voluntary cleanups because of collective action
dynamics.
Even with these positive changes, the EPA will likely have less
money to spend on site cleanup because:
(a) PRPs will no longer be held liable for pollution
occurring prior to CERCLA’s enactment;
(b) the EPA will have to pay for the cleanup of orphan
shares arising from insolvent parties;
(c) the EPA will incur substantially more litigation costs
because it will no longer be able to sue a single PRP
and have it, in turn, sue other PRPs for contribution;
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(d) the EPA will no longer be able to sue PRPs who
minimally contributed to the site pollution because the
cost of such litigation would exceed the EPA’s ultimate
recovery; and;
(e) PRPs will have less incentive to ensure that other
parties do not discharge waste because they can no
longer be held liable for a disproportionate amount of
the costs.
Nevertheless, the legislature can counterbalance this loss of
Superfund funding by removing the petroleum exclusion and
imposing special taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries, large
firms, and consumer and commercial goods that result in harm to the
environment. Moreover, the EPA can further ensure that the
Superfund has adequate funding by aggressively pursuing polluters
and employing CERCLA more efficiently. Accordingly, to make
CERCLA more equitable, efficient, and effective, the legislature
should remove CERCLA’s retroactive, joint, and several liability
scheme.
Fifth, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s uneven173 – and
possibly inequitable174 – application of remedies from site to site by
recommending that the EPA review all remedy review and approval
authorities, especially for polluted sites exceeding $50 million in
costs, to promote consistent remedy standards across the nation.175 By
ensuring consistent national standards, the EPA will no longer be
influenced to impose overly stringent cleanup standards on particular
sites due to community lobbying, and there will be fewer racial justice
concerns regarding the EPA’s remedy selection from site to site.
In addition to this, allegations of racial injustice run deeper
than what is solvable by the meager remedies selected by the EPA. In
particular, the Task Force’s recommendations do not address the
allegations that the EPA takes longer to place sites on the NPL list in
minority communities than in non-minority communities.176 Nor do
the Task Force’s recommendations address the allegations that the
EPA imposes lesser fines on polluters in minority communities than
173
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in non-minority communities.177 To address these allegations, the EPA
must conduct a thorough review of its NPL-placement policy and its
fines imposition policy to better promote consistent standards across
the nation.
Sixth, the Task Force addressed the EPA’s lack of CERCLA
enforcement against municipalities and government agencies178 by
recommending that the EPA engage with local and federal agencies
and authorities in various ways. Specifically, the Task Force
recommended, among other things, that the EPA (a) work with federal
agencies to create policy changes that promote early decision-making
by federal agencies concerning settlement negotiations;179 (b) use
comfort/status letters to address liability concerns of local
governments;180 and (c) issue policy guidance clarifying the EPA’s
position on the liability of local governments that acquire
contaminated property.181
While these recommendations encourage the EPA to engage
with municipalities and government agencies rather than merely
letting them off the hook, it does not address the EPA’s lack of
CERCLA enforcement against nonprofit organizations. Accordingly,
the EPA must engage with nonprofit organizations in a similar way to
how they did with municipalities and government agencies. In this
way, the EPA can implement CERCLA against nonprofit
organizations while at the same time working to engage with these
organizations as much as possible.
Seventh, the Task Force recommended that the EPA further
involve local governments and private actors in the cleanup process.182
Specifically, the Task Force recommended, among other things, that
the EPA (a) designate tribal, state, or local entities as leads on sites;183
(b) create and maintain an informational website to aid third-party
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cleanup and reuse;184 and (c) identify new tools and approaches to
support third parties interested in cleaning up and reusing sites.185
These recommendations will substantially help the EPA
further involve local governments and private actors in the cleanup
process. As a result, polluted sites will be cleaned up more cheaply,
quickly, and efficiently. Moreover, because the defederalization of
CERCLA is nearly impossible, these recommendations are the best
practical way for the EPA to involve local governments and private
actors in the cleanup process.
Finally, the Task Force addressed the inadequacies of the
innocent purchaser defense, bona fide purchasers defense, and
contiguous landowner defense186 by recommended that the EPA
provide further assurances to prospective purchasers using sitespecific tools.187 Specifically, the Task Force recommended that the
EPA expand its use of comfort/status letters and binding prospective
purchase agreements to provide reasonable assurances to prospective
purchasers to limit their liability.188 Moreover, to ensure that
comfort/status letters provide reasonable assurances to prospective
purchasers and PRPs, the Task Force recommended that the EPA
revise its model comfort/status letters to provide for stronger
statements addressing potential liability concerns.189 As a result of
these recommendations, prospective purchasers will no longer have to
rely on defenses that do not adequately protect them and that are
difficult to comply with. Moreover, prospective purchasers and PRPs
will be more willing to rely on comfort/status letters and involve
themselves in the revitalization of polluted properties, resulting in
greater economic efficiency and environmental progress.
CONCLUSION

The Superfund Task Force was charged with providing
recommendations and strategies for improving CERCLA’s
implementation. Specifically, the Task Force was charged with
184
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providing recommendations for how the EPA could expedite cleanup
and remediation, re-invigorate responsible party cleanup and reuse,
encourage foreign investment, promote redevelopment and
community revitalization, and engage partners and stakeholders.190 As
evidence by the Task Force’s final report, these recommendations
have improved CERCLA’s implementation.191 Nonetheless, many
structural and surface flaws remain. Indeed, CERCLA still has:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

A severe shortage of funding;
An unfair liability scheme;
Perverse incentives;
Due process concerns;
Excessive litigation costs for PRPs, and;
Social justice concerns.

Accordingly, more reform is needed to make CERCLA more efficient,
fair, and effective.
To create a more efficient, fair, and effective CERCLA, the
EPA and the legislature should pursue legislative and administrative
action to:
(1) Remove the petroleum exclusion;
(2) Reimpose and expand the Superfund taxes;
(3) Remove CERCLA’s retroactive, joint, and several
liability scheme;
(4) Create an independent board to evaluate CERCLA
liability using the Gore factors;
(5) Create an objective and racially just NPL-placement
policy and fines imposition policy, and;
(6) Engage with nonprofit organizations.
By making these legislative and administrative changes, the EPA and
the legislature can create a more effective, efficient, and equitable
CERCLA.
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